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For Your Thought
Have the legal concepts of "fault" lost the
usefulness that they might have once hod? Within
the realm of auto accidents and divorces the legal
premise of "fault" has lead to a black or white approach, but as our knowledge of sOciology and
psychology has increased, most situations seem to
be more of a nebulous and complex nature for from
being block and white.
I n his article on no fault insurance, Charles
Poston shows that liability determinations no
longer, it they ever did, fulfill the function of punishment. I n fact, every driver's premiums underwrite
those large jury decisions. Negligence cases have
developed a world of their own, apart from reality,
where the skill of a lawyer, not the needs of the injured are determinative of the final outcome.
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The same basic premise of "fault" is
questioned in Les Bailey's article on no-fault
divorce. The "grounds" for divorce are often in
reality the visible symptons of a disrupted relationship. I nstead of condemning and seeking to punish
the "guilty" perhaps the better role of the State
would be to aid in reconciliation. If this is not
possible then the legal bonds should be dissolved
with as little disruption as possible.
Perhaps it is too easy for a 'law student to
criticize that in which he does not have a vested interest, but if those who practice law are indeed part
of profession then it is they who should seek-out
change when it is obvious that a system is not serving the people. If the Legal Profession would be
willing to seek legal change, then perhaps we could
regain the respect of those people who's interest we
seek to protect. But then again how many new cars
will respect pay for...

*

JEROME F. LEAVELL

Faculty Profiles

As the Marshall Wythe School of Law expands, many new students and professors come
together to "discover" the law. Doctor Leavell is
one of six new professors which became a port of
the law school this year.
Doctor Leavell received his J.D. Degree from
the University of Mississippi in 1951 and his Ll.M.
from Yo Ie in 1965. In 1969 Doctor Leavell received

The Colonial Lawyer began a new department
with this issue. The Faculty Profile is intended to
present to the members of the Marshall-Wythe
School of Law community the fact that many new
and interesting professors come to the school to
teach as the school expands in size and ability. This
issue will introduce two of the six professors which
arrived this year. They are Jerome Leavell and
Henry Hutchinson. The remaining four new
professors will be included in the following two
issues of the Colonial Lawyer this school year. The
other four professors include Anthony Fitch, Michael
Madison, Scott Whitney and Walter Williams. An
expansion program includes more than just quantity; it is also measured by the quality of the members which are included in the quantity. It is hopeful
that this Profile will show this quality, in relation to
the development of the Marshnll-Wythe School of

~~
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a Ford Foundation Fellowship to Oxford University,
Balliol College. After studying in Oxford, Doctor
Leavell returned to the United States and earned his
J.D.S. Degree from Yale in 1972. Dodor Leavell,
also has hod several years of practical experience
in the practice of law, including membership on the
U.S. Supreme Court Bar and the Bars of several
states, namely, New York, Arkansas, Mississippi,
and Georgia.
Doctor Leavell is married and has 2 children.
He is a member of Phi Alpha Delta Law Fraternity,
The Oxford University Law Society, the American
Society for Legal History and the American Society
of Ill.!ernational Low.
As can be seen from the above facts, Doctor
Leavell has qualifications to suggest that he is a
legal scholar, but all the degrees that one can earn
doesn't show that the person holding the degrees is
a good teacher. But this is not the situation in Doctor's Leavell's case. Doctor Leavell believes that the
primary role of a teacher is to stimulate, to
provoke, and to inspire. In discussing the Socratic
Method as used in our law school, Doctor Leavell
quotes Eugene lonesco, who said, "a work is not a
series of answers, it is a series of questions. It is not
the answer that enlightens but the question." When
Doctor Leavell states "the unexamined thought is
not worth thinking," one realizes that Doctor
Leavell is .a teacher who wants his students to
"discover" the law rather tha n to be told the law.

*
T. Henry Hutchinson

Marshall-Wythe is the site of a legal experiment this year-one that reaches to Boulder,
Colorado. Teaching at the Law School this semester
is T. Henry Hutchinson, senior member of the firm
of Hutchinson, Black, Hill, Buchanan and Cook. The
experiment: Professor Hutchinson is on a one year
extended leave from his firm-with pay.
Professor Hutchinson is teaching Commercial
Law ond Business Organization this fall semester.
He says he enjoys both the contact with the students
and talking and working with the faculty. Yet Hutchinson did not originally plan to teach this year he hod planned to be taught.
The mechanics of the extended leave program
are particularly well suited to Hutchinson's firm,
due to its size: 8 members are involved in the
program. While this calls for each of the remaining
seven members to absorb one-seventh of the work
load of the absent member, such on additional load

is not burdensome. And while the financial load is
equally increased, it is, as Hutchinson observes,
"just the cost of doing business. It's no different
than carpeting on the floor or paintings or other
niceties you can put on the wall." Furthermore, Hutchinson notes, once the program is started, the load
will become less noticeable since there will always
be one man out of the firm.
If on extended leave program can be undertaken, it should, Hutchinson says, be seriously
considered. There are substantial benefits both to
the firm and the individuals. The sabbatical is not or should not -- be a "glorified vacation." The firm
benefits from the experiences, the different perspectives brought bock to the office.
Finally, the personal benefits are the best
reason for the installation of such a plan. Professor
Hutchinson said that after twenty years of practice
it was "good to go back to school and study low,"
adding that it was really the first time he had been
able to do so since taking the bar exam. The sabbatical year is a complete severance from practice- "you virtually quit for a year" -- and such a
change takes a bit of adjustment. "For the first
couple of months," Hutchinson said, " you still think
of things that should have been done or someone
you have to call, before you realize the situation."
Not to be minimized is the theory that such
leave "prepares the person for retirement; it teaches
you how to retire." This might be particularly important for members of the legal profession. But
even more important, as Professor Hutchinson concludes, the sabbatical will give him the "chance to
enjoy the practice of law for the next twenty yeo rs."
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Which Way Is The Courthouse?
Some thoughts on the desirability of
clinical legal education.

,

by
Charles E. Friend, Asst. Professor of
'-ow, T. C. Williams School of Law,
University of Richmond, Virginia.
Prior to the mid-1950s, any legal educator who
dared to suggest that the law school curriculum
could be modified to include courses and programs
of practica I application ran a very serious risk of
being burned at the stake. The prevailing view was
that law school should be an extended voyage into
the theoretical, with emphasis on mental gymnastics
and bad Latin. It was felt that law school should be
devoted entirely to the absorption of theory and the
development of the ability to "think like a lawyer."
Those who were ever troubled with the question of
the actual, demonstrable value of this approach
were usually successful in repressing the doubts,
usually on the basis that the student could "find out
where the courthouse is" after graduation. Three
years were thought, after all, to be scarcely enough
time to 'train the student to be a legal scholar, much
less to be a lawyer. Consequently, law students of
the last century and a half have been emerging
from their three long, dull, expensive years in the
halls of ivy to find that they are still virtually useless
as practicing attorneys. Every law school graduate
who enters the actual practice of law discovers that,
however impressive his grasp of Roman Law may
be, he is still completely in the dark when required
to defend a traffic c ha rge or select a jury.
I n the last few years, this ivory-tower approach
to legal education has come under increasing attack, although probably for the wrong reasons. The
awakening social conscience of the American
nation has manifested itself in the law school community in an increased interest on the part of law
students in participating in legal aid projects and
third-year practice programs, and those who actively press for such programs usually do so upon
the assumption that this should be done because it
is socially and ideologically the desirable thing. The
motivation is To Serve Our Fellow Man, Noblesse
Oblige (note the compulsive use of Latin), the White
Man's Burden, etc.
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The cold, uncharitable fact is, however, that
unless and until a law school--any law school-offers
some reasonable proportion of practical, nuts-andbolts experience to the student, that law school is
not performing whot is, after all, its primary purpose--to train future lawyers. That is the real reason
why the law school curriculum needs reexamination, and it has nothing to do with new concepts of social justice. It is, and always has been, a
question of the law school's true mission.

The stereotyped reply to the foregoing assertion is that it requires three years to present the
student with the necessary theoretical foundation;
he can always learn to be an (ugh) practicing attorney later. Of course, law graduates do learn-eventually--but the sad fact is that the graduate who
enters a large firm frequently finds himself
relegated to the library for months, because he is
not equiped to be of any other service to his employer; and the brave soul who hangs out his own
shingle finds that he is completely unprepared to
function in his client's interest in even the simplest
courtroom situation. The result is that, after three
years of law school, the graduate finds himself
faced with another painful period of unofficial apprenticeship which lasts for a bare minimum of one
or two years, and usually longer, until he has indeed discovered how to function as a practicing attorney.
I n light of this state of affairs, it is difficult to
understand the viewpoint of those who regard practice-oriented law school courses and programs as
some necessary evil, permitted in the curriculum
only to keep the animals quiet.
Happily, this attitude is fast disappearing, and
an increasing number of schools are adding practical courses to the programs, with resultant benefits
to the students, to the profession, and to society as
a whole.
Unfortunately, while it is very easy to jump on
the clinical bandwagon and praise the principle of
practical legal education, it is very difficult to determine how the law school curriculum should be
restructured to make room for the optimum number
of practice-oriented courses. To neg lect the
traditional courses which are the foundation stones
of a solid legal education in favor of forty or fifty
hours of legal aid, trial practice, law-office
management, and habeas corpus for fun and profit
would be as bad as (if not worse than) the purely
theoretical approach. A well-reasoned balance
needs to be struck, and the pressure being brought
to bear by those who conceive their role as law
students to be solely the immediate establishment of
a student·run storefront law office in every block
should not induce us to act in haste or to introduce
too much of a good thing.
Clearly (as we lawyers say), the first year of
law school needs to be devoted to a solid grounding in the keystones of the law--torts, contracts,
criminal low, property, etc. Without a sound
knowledge of these fundamental areas, any subsequent attempt at legal education would be an
exercise in futility. In the first year, the student has
neither the time nor the background necessary to
make any clinical experience meaningful, and none
should be attempted.

In the second year, although there remains a
substantial body of basic law to be taught (wills,
trusts, evidence, business organizations, tax, etc.),
the student has acquired enough of the fundamentals to make practical applications somewhat
more meaningful, but the desirability of permitting
or encouraging any significant amount of practical
work at that level is still questionable. However, the
typical second-year student, although still lacking
background in some of the major areas, is
becoming restive and wants some latitude for electives to relieve the weary hours. A taste of the
clinical can certainly'serve to make the second year
more palatable, if nothing else.
It is in the third year, of course, that maxium attention can be paid to practical subjects. Assuming
for the moment that a third year of law school is
needed at all, the year can be mode immensely
more valuable to the prospective attorney by a
carefully planned introduction to the practice of law
through elective or even (heresy! blasphemy!)
required courses in practice-oriented subjects.
There are several possible approaches, but it
would appear that at a minimum each curriculum
should include a classroom course in trial tactics
and procedures, supplemented by a mock-trial
program in which 01/ students may participate. A
course in the arts and sciences of in-office practice,
. as differentiated from trial technique, would seem
desirable, and on internship program involving
clerkship for credit in a local low office would be of
great benefit. The participation of students in the
true "legal aid" program--i.e., students assisting
practicing attorneys in advising the poor--provides
the student with invaluable experience in the difficult art of counseling, and should be pursued
wherever such programs are available.
The third-year practice programs, in which
third-year students actually represent clients in local
courts on minor matters, are popular with students
but present some very serious difficulties, including
possible constitutional objections. Although it is
very difficult to convince students that the antipathy
in some jurisdictions to such programs is not merely
a rbitra ry, reactiona ry discri mi notion against them,
the fact is that the advisability as well as the
feasibility of third-year practice is at least
questionable. There can be little question that the
program. if available, would be of immense value
to the student. Whether the public would benefit
equally is doubtful, but under carefully controlled
conditions socially desirable results might be obtained.
Whatever the approach token, and whatever
the specific modifications or additions to the
traditional curriculum, it appears certain that both

(Continued on page 14)
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to the land he has created, unless the General
Assembly may be persuaded to give him one. If he
has no title, a fortiori he should not have to pay
real estate taxes. Yet, it would also appear that he
would through use acquire vested rights in the land,
even though technically he owns only the fill
material and the State retains title to the land below·
mean low water. Practically speaking, however, a
VMRC permit is tantamount to a grant in this
situation, since it is extremely unlikely that it would
ever be revoked and the riparian property owner
ordered to restore the state-owned bottom to its
original condition. Because vested rights would certainly be acquired after a bulkhead was constructed, there is a strong argument that such a
revocation would amount to a taking, and the State
would have to compensate the landowner for his
loss.
Looking at the situation from the public's
stand-point, the state is often inadequately compensated by individuals using state-owned bottom.
It is true that the applicant must pay a permit fee of
$25.00 if the cost of the project is less than
$10,000.00 and $100.00 if it is more than
$10,000.00. " Also, the VMRC exacts a royalty of
10c to 30c per cubic yard for removal of
subaqueous land,'5 and, therefore, the person who
plans to dredge below mean low water to obtain
land fill will pay the state a small fee for the dredge
material. On the other hand, if the fill material is
obtained from some other source, the state gets
nothing for what may be perpetual use of its
property. Moreover, there are probably many persons." who opt for bypassing the time-cansuming
VMRC administrative process and dredge without a
permit. If the VMRC does not establish a viable
system of ascertaining when this occurs, private
parties will benefit at public expense with impunity.
The legal and environmental problems created
by allowing perpetual use of state-owned bottom
lands were in the post relatively insignificant, since
it was assumed that the demand for land would
never be greater than the supply availaole for edcevelopment. Today, however, real estate
developers are aware that there is an increasing
demand for waterfront property; that nearly aJi
natural riparian land hos already been exploited or
set aside for future development; and that it is thus
very profitable to "create" waterfront property by
filling wetlands or below mean low water. It is
suggested that to protect the enviroment and to
bring certainty to an ambiguous area of the law,
the General Assembly should enact legislation
which further limits the use of state-owned bottom
lands. This could be accomplished by requiring
riparian landowners to pay the state rent based on
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the value of the bottom used, computed by considering environmental damage, econmic loss to the
public, and other relevant factors. In addition, the
VMRC should be directed to adopt a system
whereby individuals who dredge or fill without a
permit could be apprehended before they complele
their illegal and environmentally destructive activities. Such measures would not halt utilization of
bottom lands, but would encourage responsible
development and result in compensation to the state
for use of a valuable public resource.
*
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(COURTHOUSE)

(from page 5)

professional and social pressures dictate some reevaluation of the existing approach to legal
education. Many law schools have successfully instituted programs of the types mentioned, and no
doubt many more will do so, and in great
profusion.
My personal view is that legal education needs
to be more responsive to the te~per of the times
and the needs of the profession as it exists today,
but I feel thot today's low student must be careful
not to fall into the trap of believing that a successful
navigation of the first semester of low qualifies him
to eschew further interest in the basic and
traditional functions of the law school. A solid
theoretical foundation is essential to success as an
attorney, and it always will be. Academic flexibilty
is needed; academic revolution is not.
Student understanding of that fact is essential
if we are to fulfill our mutual obligations to our
chosen profession.

*

YES, VIRGINIA,
THERE IS NO-FAULT
INSURANCE

-Charles Poston
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oday's growing popular demand for improvement in the automobile insurance industry has
found responsive expression in many forms. Some
schemes favor keeping the present tort liability
system with modifications designed to meet the
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most serious complaints consumers have voiced;
other plans-and certainly those most publici:rea-- ~
have proposed abolishing the tort liability system
altogether and replacing it with a "no-fault" insura nce system.

The essence of no-fault liability insurance is
the absence of the requirement of finding tort
liability (or fault) in the insured before an
obligation to pay arises.' Most plans provide that
the insured's own company will pay costs for
medical treatment up to a set amount or threshold
level. 2
Virginia, like her sister states, has felt the
rising discontent with the present insurance system.
Quick cancellation of policies by some companies-frequently publicized by lieutenant Governor Henry
Howell--prompted the General Assembly to place
restrictions on the companies' right to cancel
automobile liability insurance policies. 3 By the 1972
session of the General Assembly the automobile insurance reform movement had clearly grown to be
a force of some strength. Several bills purporting to
be no-fault measures were introduced, but some of
these were no-fault proposals in name only. Others
represented serious attempts to effect useful change
in Virginia's automobile insurance system.
Most states have at least considered no-fau It
proposals, and approximately ten have adopted
some form of no-fault automobile liability insurance.' Most of these supposed no-fault laws have
simply modified the traditional system bosed in tort
liability.
Massachusetts ond Florida have perhaps the
truest of the no-fault lows, both of which are bosed
on the Keeton-O'Connell recommendations,S which
are found in their work sasic Protection for the
Automobile Accident Vicfim. 6 This work was the
first comprehensive study of the automobile tort
liability system undertaken with a view toward
reforming it. The study, of course, sparked 0 great
deal of debate omong the academic community,
legal societies, consumer groups, and insurance
organizations. Supporters rapidly gathered under
the no-fault label, believing it to be the panacea for
all automobile insurance ills; and opposition to the
proposal formed just as quickly. Some of the opposition was based upon serious, thoughtful
reasoning; some represented an emotional response
to what was seen as 0 challenge to financial interests. Certainly, neither side hod a monopoly on
reason and logical thinking, but it seems that every
serious study· of the automobile insurance problem
resulted in recommendations for reform, whether or
not under the tort liability system. 7
THE MASSACHUSETTS PLAN
About two years ago Massachusetts enacted
the first no-fault statute in the country.a The
Massachusetts Plan, in brief, provides that every car

owner must purchase at least $2000 in medical and
wage continuation benefits protection for his
passengers and injured pedestrians. Unless a bone
is fractured, permanent impairment results, or
medical bills exceed $500, claims for general
damages, in addition to the insurance benefits
provided by the law, are not permitted. In other
words, immunity from tort liability is granted up to
a $500 threshold level. The tort liability system is
retained for general damages in excess of $500 as
well as for disfigurement, fractures, and in some
cases, part payment for last wages. Subrogation of
claims is permitted when tort liability is found. If
the injured driver is intoxicated, doped, or if he intentionally injures himself, no-fault coverage does
not apply.9
When the Massachusetts Plan went into effect
in January, 1971, a fifteen percent reduction in
premiums was ordered for personal injury insurance. Before the year had ended, however, the
state insurance commissioner, seeing that the
savings actually realized under no-fault insurance
exceeded the initial estimates, ordered a further
27.6% reduction for 1972. Prior to 1971,
Massachusetts had one of the highest premium rates
in the nation; but during the first nine months under
no-fault, there was a 60.6% reduction in average
claims. Although the figures for 1970 were com. puted differently from those for 1971, there was
clearly a substantial saving to the policy holders in
premium rates under the no-fault law. In 1972 the
no-fault coverage was extended to property damage
as well as personal injury.'o
The Plan's immediate success in Massachusetts
resulted in widespread publicity of the savings to
the policy holders, and this promise of substantially
lower rates won new converts to no-fault proposals.
Four more states have since adopted compromise
plans, others have ordered insurance companies to
offer no-fault coverage on on optional basis, and a
Jorge majority of the remaining states including
Virginia are studying various proposals for
automobile insurance reform.
ACTION IN VIRGINIA
In December, 1968, the Virginia State Bar appointed a committee to undertake an impartial
study of various "Basic Protection Plans" which
were then being proposed by variou's groups and to
offer recom mendations as to the best method of
reform, if such was needed. The report, submitted
for the year ending June 30, 1971, urged retention
of the basic tort liability system with certain
modifications. It suggested giving courts not of
record exclusive jurisdiction over claims up to ond
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including $3000, abolition of the right of removal
to a cou rt of record, a nd retention of the present
right of appeal. The committee sought to reduce
court time and, in some coses, court costs by
allowing written medical reports as well as bills
and estimates for repairs given under oath to be adm itted into evidence as exceptions to the heresay
rule. The committee felt that the contingency fee
system allowed persons with valid claims who could
not otherwise afford to pay attorneys' fees to seek
relief in court. The State Bar committee therefore
urged that the contingency fee system be retained
with supervisory authority lodged in the trial court.
The committee's major recommendations concerned the substantive law of negligence in
Virginia. It recommended abrogation of tort immunities covering governmental units, charitable
organizations, and the relationships of husband to
wife and child to parent. It endorsed repeal of the
statutory requirement that a guest may recover only
upon a showing of gross negligence by the driver,
and recommended adoption of a system of comparative negligence which would, by its nature,
abolish the doctrines of last clear chance and contributory negligence, which now prevent recovery in
many automobile negligence cases. Except for the
comparative negligence recommendation, the
changes suggested by the committee were relatively
minor, with no support being shown for a change in
the basic tort liability system. 12 Many of the recommendations offered by the committee could be attacked on grounds of self interest. For example,
abrogation of the immunities might increase the
number of recoveries and perhaps open some
deeper pockets to plaintiffs, thus giving their attorneys larger fees. As a whole, however, the committee's recommendations represent what seems to
be a conscientious attempt to evaluate the present
system in I ig ht of the a Iternatives avo ilable today.
The basic proposals of the State Bar Committee
were introduced into the 1972 session of the
General Assembly as House Bill Number 594. 13
Perhaps the most vocal opposition to the nofault concept comes not from the State Bar as a
whole but rather from the Virginia Trial lawyers
Association, an organization composed in large
measure of negligence attorneys. During the 1972
session of the legislature, the Virginia Trial lawyers
Association and the Virginia Association of Defense
Counsel urged the legislature to require automobile
insurance policies to include benefits for· medical
expenses and loss of wages. No-fault advocates,
however, attacked the suggestion as one failing to
deal with the basic problems confronting
automobile owners. They charged that the additional coverage would result in substantial increases in premium rates. I.
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Early in the 1972 session the Virginia Advisbry
legislative Council (VAlC), a study group composed, in part, of attorneys and legislators, urged
the adoption of no-fault automobile insurance in
Virginio. The VAlC cited widespread dissatisfaction
with the present system, overpayment of some
claims and delayed payment of others, and overprotection of the negligent party in comparison to
the victim as reasons for endorsing no-fault. Among
the advantages it expected from no-fault were more
protection for the same cost, prompt payment
regardless of fault by one's own insurer, and
reduced litigation while maintaining tort liability for
the more serious cases. The VAlC was closely
divided in adopting this position, and several members expressed their opposition to it. One Council
member charged that the plan "allows payment of
large sums of money to the drunk, willful, wanton,
and negligent driver." IS Others eva luated the
proposal as a cautious but well-considered
position. 16
Along with the genuine no-fault bills which fell
into the legislative hoppers during the 1972 session,
there were many bills proposing amendments to the
existing automobile liability insurance laws.
Perhaps the public demand coupled with what
seemed to be a real threat of a federal law on the
subject made the issue an even stronger one. Of the
bills considered, the major proposal to survive the
session was a bill entitled "The Virginia Automobile
Accident Victim Reparations Act", hereinafter
referred to as the Williams Bill. 17 Continued to the
1973 session, this bill followed the VAlC proposal
in many respects and was sent to the Committee on
Corporations, Insurance, and Banking.
The Williams Bill provides prompt payment of
medical expenses upon valid proof that a loss has
been sustained. Duplication of payment for the
same injury is prohibited, and the right to sue in tort
is restricted to cases in which medical treatment expenses exceed $1000 or when the victim suffers
death, dismemberment, disfigurement, or permanent
disability. The bill is not as drastic a reform as
other no-fault proposals, however it provides both
prompt payment of medical expenses and wage
continuation benefits to occident victims. Indeed
one of the major criticisms of the tort liability
system is that those involved in serious accidents
having large claims are often delayed by extended
judicial proceedings while minor claims are settled
quickly because of the financial impracticality of
litigating them. Of course, persons in the former
situation are frequently those who can least afford
a delayed settlement. 18

Several detailed insurance reform bills were
introduced in the 1972 Assembly. At least two were
entitled the "Virginia Automobile Accident Victim
Reparations Act."·9 The common theme throughout
these bills was to insure prompt payment of benefits
to automobile occident victims. Many conclusions
may be drawn from a comparison of these bills, but
it seems indisputable that there is a growing concern in Virginia not only for dependable cor insurance but also for prompt settlement of claims
when accidents do occur. The number of bills introduced to effect some change in the insurance low
reflects not only a legislative concern but also a
realization that the voter has a vested interest in the
issue. Early in the session, Governor Holton told the
General Assembly that no-fault insurance is "on
ideo whose time has come." Among the advantages
he sees init are rapid payments for occident victims
and a more equitable distribution of payments
among those injured. 20
Perhaps the greatest single reason for
Virginia's public interest in insurance reform is concern for the premium rate structure. Insurance rates
have not remained constant; neither have they
decreased. 2' Every co r owner has regula r persona I
contact with premium payments. He pays them
when they fall due and receives nothing tangible in
return until he is unfortunate enough to have on occident, in which case he may well face prolonged
negotiation and litigation before settlement. When
on alternative offering substantial reduction in his
premiums is proposed, the cor owner cannot be expected teodvocate retention of the tort liability
system.
Ql.!JfSTIONS

AND

CHALLENGES

In the midst of the clamor from various sectors
of the pub~ic in favor of no-fault, there are numberous objections to be contended with. These objections fall into three categories: constitutional,
traditional, and conceptual.
Constitutional challenges began in 1971 with
the case of Pinnick v. Cleary in which the
Massachusetts low survived a charge that it violated
the right to trial by jury, separation of powers doctrine, and due process of low under the federal and
state constitutions. 22 Under the no-fau It statute the
plaintiff recovered for medical expenses but not for
loss of earning capacity or pain and suffering. On
appeal he claimed that the low deprived him of his
constitutional right to full recovery in tort under the
due process clouse. The court held that the statute
was valid in that it was rationally related to the
legitimate legislative purpose of regulating the in·
surance industry so as to provide more efficient administration of justice in automobile negligence

liThe greatest single reason for ... public
interest in insurance reform is... the
premium rate structure."

cases. futhermore, the court stated that no one "has
a vested interest in any rule of low entitling him to
insist that it shall remain unchanged for his
benefit. "
In 1972, however, a contrary decision was
handed down by the Illinois Supreme Court when it
struck down the state's no-fault law as being
violative of due process under the state and federal
constitutions. The facts of the case were similar to
those in Pinnick but the statute was not identical to
the Massachusetts low. Here the court said that the
low limiting amounts recoverable by occident victims for pain and suffering was invalid under the
Illi nois constitution. 23
These cases illustrate not only the conflicting
views of no-fault's constitutional validity but also the
fact that no uniform Iowan the subject should be
expected unless a federal law is passed. State constitutions, traditions, and preferences will dictate
variations in insurance plans, and this is probably a
desirable situation. Certainly state legislatures
should be allowed to adopt the plans most suitable
for their states. But again there is criticism of this
view, noting that a conflict of lows problem of some
magnitude would frustrate settlement of claims of
out-of-state drivers. It is difficult to see, however,
how no-fault systems would lead to any more of a
conflicts problem than now existing under the many
variations of the tort liability systems in effect
throughout the nation,2'
Another basis at opposition to no-fau It is that
it does violence to the ancient common low tenet
that a wrongdoer must pay tor his own misconduct.
Does the wrongdoer now pay for his negligent
driving or does his insurance company? All drivers
pay insurance premiums of some sort. Accident settlement costs are certainly passed on to those insured through premium rates, I n short, it is
something of a fiction to insist that the negligent
driver really pays for the damage he causes, To be
sure, his premium rate may increase after on accident, but that burden is not really comparable to

(Continued on page 18)
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the. situation of his having to satisfy any judgments
against him out of his own pocket. The criminal
law, on the other hand, does punish the wreck less
and negligent driver in many cases. No-fault
proposals do not ottempt to disturb the criminal
sanctions against such drivers. This moral
justification for the present tort system as applied to
automobile negiligence cases, then, tends to lose its
force when one delves beneath the surface. Perhaps
it is not inaccurate to say that automobile
negligence low has to some extent prostituted the
basis of the tort liability system by encouraging the
development of liability insurance to protect the
negligent driver from the consequences of his
negligent acts.25
Finally, there are the assertions that no-fault
will not result in lower rates at all; that instead
rates will remain unchanged or may even rise. 26
Possibly there was merit to these positions before
no-fault insurance was tested in practice, but the
success in Massachusetts tends to support the view
that no-fault plans, in fact, offer substantial
premium reductions. There has been no convincing
evidence of no-fault. bringing higher rates that has
not been discredited by the cost reduction of approximately forty percent in Massachusetts. 27
CONCLUSIONS
Change is in the wind for the automobile insurance industry in Virginia, and political leaders
ignore the public concern over the issue at their
peril. Jhe real question is related to the form the
changes will take in Virginia and the extent of the
changes. It is a question that demands an objective
study of all alternatives, not an emotional, selfserving or haphazard approach. The no-fault concept poses some serious questions that must be answered, but it appears to have captured the public's
support. The comparative negligence approach
recommended by the State Bar committee certainly
presents what may be an acceptable alternative. Its
major obstacle, however, is the tremendous amount
of publicity the no-fault proposals have had and the
sensational success of the Massachusetts Plan. The
consumer will tend to opt for the plan that serves
him best for the least cost, and other interest groups
will naturally be influenced by their special concerns. The General Assembly, then, must face the
problem by considering all alternatives and adopting the plan most suitable for Virginia. 28,
There is nothing sacred in a concept or idea
just because it is old, and prudent change of a constructive nature should not be feared. The no-fault
proposals do not represent change for its own sake,
but, rather, offer a plausible alternative for coping
with a need-the need for prompt, efficient in-
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surance coverage at a reasonable cost. While it is a
proposal that alters a basic area of the law, our
legal system is, idealiy, geared to accomodate such
change when necessary. From the consumer's
viewpoint, no-foult insurance mokes sense; and
because the consumer in this instance is largely the
middle-class individual, who is also the typical
voter, Virginia can anticipate the General Assembly's adoption of some form of no-fault automobile
liability insurance within the near future.
""
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No-Fault Divoroe-

BEYOND
GOOD & EVIL
-Les Bailey
We may take judicial notice that the family,
held together by that lega I, affectional, spiritual
relationship called marriage, is the keystone of our
social order. Yet vital to our civilized life as this
crucial relationship is, it is being dissolved at an
alarming rate through archaic legal machinery
which encourages disrespect for the law; which is
cumbersone, irrelevant, and socially costly and
painful; and which makes no provision to help
alienated spouses understand the causes of thier
disaffection and so effectively deal with them as to
preserve the ma rriage.
A brief look at the abuses prevalent in the
United States ~nder the adversary, fault oriented
divorce system will 'illustrate the sad truth of the
previous statement characterizing archaic American
divorce law and suggest the need for fundamental
reform. In the divorce law of most states divorce
will be granted only where one spouse is able to
prove his mate guilty of some marital offense
specified by statute such as adultery, desertion, extreme cruelty, etc. I Because such grounds are difficult to prove, parties are encouraged to perjure
themselves, indulge deliberately in immoral staged
acts or collude to consent to or not to contest
divorce. 2 An alternative way to circumvent the
stringent grounds of divorce required to be proved
in one state was made possible by Williams v.
North Carolina. 3 The out-of-jurisdiction "quickie"
divorce in some such place as Nevada legitimized
by Williams not only circumvents the law but is
wasteful of resources, both of the financial resources of the party involved and of the court resources
of the State granting the divorce on the basis of
what is often a perjured statement of domiciliary intent.' In the adversary, fault system each spouse
retains his own attorney and girds himself for a bitter battle which often involves exaggerated namecalling and fiercely pious and vindictive charges.
The system promotes the struggle to establish the
requisite fault grounds for divorce and to gain the
upper hand in wrangles over property, custody, and
support. The tension and hostility attendant to the
acrimonious atmosphere of such a knockdown,
drag-out battle not only renders slim the prospect
for reconciliation but also heavily burdens the time
of already badly congested courts. The greatest suf-
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ferers from the tension and hate stimulated by the
adversary-fault system are often the children who
are buffeted by opposing forces beyond their comprehension. s

Absence of imputations of guilt and innocence would spare children the painfu I sense that one of thei r pa rents had
been publically exposed as an evil or
malicious person, while the other had
been judged, by comparison, to be a
paragon of virtue... Children would suffer much less as a result of their parent's
divorce if they could see it as a human
tragedy which everyone concerned had
tried to prevent, but which despite all efforts, cou Id not in the end be avoided. 6
Perhaps the greatest source of abuse under the
fault system is found in such defenses to an action
for divorce as recrimination.? This defense precludes
relief for the complainant who does not approach
the court with "clean hands".8 There are obvious
flaws in such a defense. First, one indulges in social
fantasy by believing that incident to most marriage
failures, there is a guilt-innocence dichotomy.9
Secondly, by counter-charging complainant with a
legally cognizable marital offense, a "vindictive
spouse", on purely vengeful motivation, is enabled
to block relief provided by law. 'o Thirdly, one
spouse can employ recrimination as a tool of extortion to win unconscionable concessions in mat·
ters of property division, custody, alimony, and support. II But surely the greatest flaw of the defense of
recriminotion is that where not proved in fact, its
pleading so accentuates an already bitter misunderstanding as to severely dim the chances of
reconciliation.
Thus there is a cornucopia of suffering and
social waste incident to the abuses of an adversary
divorce system unprofitably preoccupied with gUilt.
Why not then, one may ask, abolish all grounds for
divorce and institute a system based, perhaps, upon
the fulfillment of a required period of separation?
Or why not grant a divorce at any time one is
requested merely upon the consent of both parties?
Both cancepts are unworkable because afflicted
with costly side effects. Separation as a divorce
standard is undesirable because, if set too short,
may encourage divorce, and if set too long, the parties must pay dearly in emotional suffering and
financial loss caused by 0 delay attended by the absence of an immediate right to remarry. J2 Both concepts are utterly wrecked by the vindictive spouse
who witholds the consent essential to the operation
of both. 13 Facile acceptance of consent as the

panacea among grounds for divorce is foreclosed
by the necessary recognition that, as a third party
to the marriage contract, the state is vitally concerned to ensure that marriage not be dissolved
merely upon the whim of its partners. 14 Surely that
state is unwise whose facility of divorce provokes
the death of a marriage whose partners hastily
reacted to temporary frustration, a death which
might easily have been prevented had the state
provided a proceeding which required a delay long
enough to expose the threatened marriage to the
possible saving grace of skilled counseling. 15

SUGGESTIONS & SOlUTIONS
The obuse potential, inequity, inefficiency, and
suffering which is a tragic commentary on adversary, fault-oriented divorce can be eliminated
only by fundamental reform. Concern with fault,
guilt, etc. strikes only ot the surface symptoms of a
failing marriage, and even then, such concern does
not respond to effectively remedy the desperate
need of estranged spouses to identify, objectively
understand, and attempt to deal with the real
causes of their fractured marital relationship.16 A
study commission ·in New Jersey has succinctly identifiedthe 'relevant inquiry of substantive divorce law:

Demonstrable fault is frequently the
res~lt of, rather than the couse of
marital breakdown,. It is the public interest in private morality, in marriage as
an institution, that is best served by terminating marriages that have failed.
There is no vested right to immunity
from divorce... blocking the offender
from terminating a meaningless relationship and perhaps creating a soc;ially
desirable one. 17

It would seem then that an enlightened substantive
divorce law would focus on the marriage relationship itself, by providing some appropriate
procedure to determine: (1) whether the marriage
relationship has broken down, (2) whether the
breakdown can be repaired, (3) if the latter is true,
what are the causes of the breakdown and how can
they be prevented or resolved. Why waste the
state's time and resources in litigating guilt/innocence which is of questionable relevance to

(Continued on page J5)
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marriage viability when, as observed by a noted
authority, "most people believe that marriage
should be terminated when the husbond-wife
relationship is no longer able to function."?'8 The
"martial breakdown concept. .. is the heart of
most...recent legislation"'9 ond "is implicit in some
of the statutory grounds for divorce appearing in
the va rious states. "20 Since these statutory
provisions embrace social reality by implying a nofault basis for certain divorce grounds, why not
bring the entire statute into alignment with the
enlightened recognition that, where the marriage
relationship is irreparably defunct, an efficient. consistent dissolution of the marriage contract not only
averts needless suffering but increases the public
respect for a vital segment of the law.

I

"Reconciliation chances should be vastly improved; public respect for divorce law would be
enhanced; considerable time would be saved for
badly congested courts."

THE THEORIES OF "NO-FAULT"
Granted that substantive divorce law should
ground its authorization of a marriage dissolution
on whether the marital relationship can be retored,
the naturally resulting question is: what standard
should be applied °in making this determination?
Perhaps only some experimentation will resolve the
issue of whether the determination should be one of
fact by experts in the behaviorial sciences or one of
law by the judge. Most states with new no-fault
divorce legislation have made the determination
one of law to be made by the judge upon the basis
of all the eVidence, both lay and expert. 21 One
eminent authority suggests that a grant of divorce
be based on the "submission of satisfactory
evidence that, on the basis of a thorough clinical investigation ... , it was reasonably apparent thal.. .. "
the marriage was shattered beyond repair. When
the judge is so satisfied, "divorce would be granted
without guilt being imputed to either party."22
Clinical examination of the viability of the
marital relationship with an eye to determining the
likelihood of repairing the fracture should be the

crucial part of the no-fault evidentiary process.
Since public interest in the stability of marriages is
great, this clinical examination should be made incident to 0 prescribed series of conciliotion
sessions, participated in, if possible, by both
spouses and directed by skilled professional counselors.
Divorce court conciliation departments exist in
at least fifteen states 23 and are valuable not only in
saving marriages but are particularly helpful in
establishing a calm and objective attitude between
the spouses during divorce proceedings even though
reconciliation proves impossible. 24 Such an attitude
is invaluable in the adjudication of such collateral
issues as property division, alimony, support, and
custody by making justice more likely and by saving
much time for badly congested courts. 25 Such conciliation is badly needed because divorce petitions
are often filed in search of some competent body
which can provide help by impartially identifying
the casuses of the mortal conflict and by suggesting
practicable methods to resolve them. 26 One possible
objection to conciliation counseling is that, if made
mandatory, it may amount to a state invasion of the
individual's constitutional right to Privacy.28
Presently there is no clear statement in
the law specifying the rights of divorce
litigants to refuse to discuss or reveal
their private or intimate relationships.28
The effectiveness of conciliation counseling
would be vitiated without such discussion and
revealation. One solution to this problem, employed
in proposed Virginia legislation, provides the incentive of accelerating the dissolution decree for
those who agree to cooperate with the conciliation
process. 29 I nvasion of privacy problems are thus
avoided by making conciliation counseling voluntary.
I n summary then, whot are the advantages of
a system of no-foult divorce coupled with an incentive-oriented conciliotion process? Reconciliation
chances should be vastly improved; public respect
for divorce law would be enhonced;30 considerable
time would be saved for bodly congested courts;
collateral issues could be more easily and justly
resolved and children spared the painful and
psychologically damaging exposure to needless
hostility and tension; extortion-provoking defenses
would be abolished. If reconciliation proved impossible, both partners could come away from the
morriage as whole persons, cognizant of the
reasons the marriage failed and thereby prepared
with an awareness making more bright the
prospects of future marital success. 31 Society woulbe
be spored the existence of a residue of bitter and
quilt plagued divorce(e}s.
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" ... providing a more "dignified and
blameless way our' when a court finds ... that
the union is irreparably destroyed."

DISSENT AND DISSATISFACTION
To conclude this general discussion of no-fault
divorce, two widely voiced objections to the concept
will be considered. The first is that no-fault divorce
legislation makes divorce so easy that it actually
provokes or encourages divorce. There is no empirical evidence to support this charge, and the
argument ignores the ease with which divorce can
be presently obtained in almost any jurisdiction by
such expedient meons as perjury, fraud, collusion or
flight to another state. 32 The other objection is
grounded on genuine and understandable Christian
concern that by enacting no-fault divorce statutes
the state is violating the principle laid down by God
that divorce be based solely on adultery. One who
makes this seemingly valid objection may be put at
ease by being reminded of the Lord Jesus Christ's
command to "render therefore unto Caesar the
things which be Caesar's and unto God the things
which be God's"33 Every Christian marriage has
two dimensions: its spiritual dimension, over which
God is sovereign; and its legal dimension, over
which Caesar, the state, is sovereign. The state does
not initiate nor has it the authority to order the
dissolution of the spiritual plane of a marriage.
Only God can do that, and He has conditioned the
grant of a divorce of separation (a mensa et thoro),
the only type He authorizes, solely on the offense of
adultery. Therefore, temporal courts have jurisdiction only to dissolve the marriage contract and its
attendant legal obligations. Spiritual responsibility
for transgression against the spiritual dimension of
the marriage rests with its partners and not with the
state, since it is they, who have the will and free
choice to heal the fractured relationship and repent
in the sight of God for their transgressions against
the relationship. As one thoughtful commentator has
observed:

Yet the marriage vows may persist in effect after the divorce on a moralspiritual level with both parties
refraining from remarrying and thus
maintaining fidelity until the death of
the o.ther po rty. 34
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It is the duty of all courts and attorneys, and
especially Christian judges and attorneys to do
everything which is ethically within their power to
encourage reconciliation between spouses who
come to them with marital problems or seeking
divorce. Appropriate referrals should be made to
professional counselors for conciliatory service
which is beyond the competence of the attorney.

THE VIRGI N IA PROPOSAL
Turning now to an examination of key
provisions of the proposed revision to Title 20,
Chapter 6 of the Virginia Code (Dissolution,
Separation, and Annulment),31 Section 20.1-153 of
the revision admirably states it to be a policy of the
law to deal with divorce by realistically focusing on
the marriage relationship itself to assess its viability
in determining whether a decree of dissolution
should be granted. 36 This realistic orientation of the
law is further illustrated by the policy goal of
mitigating divorce-caused harm to spouses and
children and by the gool of a dispute settlement
process characterized by an amicable atmosphere.
In section 20.1-155(1) "Irreparable breakdown" is made the sole ground of divorce. 37 Wisely
the section provides that such a breakdown of the
marriage relationship may be found only when it i's
shown by substantial evidence that there are such
fundamental differences that the "legitimate objects
of matrimony have been destroyed ond there
remains no reasonable likelihood that the marriage'
can be preserved." These terms seem to be to the
point and will be further clarified in the contect of
particular cases which construe them in the Virginio
Supreme Court of Appeals.
Sections 20.1-163 and 20.1-175 prescribe a
conciliation procedure whi.ch must be subscribed to
by the parties if they wish a decree of dissolution
immediately after the required ninety day conciliation period instead of waiting for the
prescribed period of one year to elapse, should
they elect not to porticipote in conciliation. 38 This
provision uses the incentive technique already
discussed to avoid objections of invasion of privacy.
However, section 20.1-163 requires respondent to
complete and file a conciliation questionaire within
thirty days of being served with copies of pelillon
and summons. This writer feels that this provision is
an unwarranted invasion of respondent's privacy
despite statutory assurances that respondent's
questionaire "shall be confidential and may be
used only by the court. counsel for the parties, or
persons authorized by the court."

Section 20.1-176, granting an emergency
decree sooner than ninety days at the discretion of
the court, is warded in such vague and overbroad
language as to invite abuse. This provision should
be re-written autharizing this accelerated decree
only upon a showing of ane of several specified
grounds of emergency. Section 20.1-170 wisely
abolishes all defenses to an action for divorce such
as recriminotion, conivance, and collusion.
That the court may "refuse to grant the petition
on the uncorroborated testimony of the pa rties or
either of them" is inconsistent with the basic reform
objectives of this no-fault oriented revision .. Where
there are no third party witnesses to the conditions
which evince an irreparably broken marriage
relationship, one vindictive party can block
dissolution of a dead and intolerable relationship.
This inconsistent provision should be struck from
section 20.1-105.
With the objections just noted remedied as
suggested, this code revision would seem to bring
Virginia's substantive divorce law into harmony with
what appears to be the most enlightened modern
thinking on the subject. This thinking, as already
pointed out, espouses a divorce law that uses every
reasonably available means of judicially encouraging the preservation of our society's key
relationship while providing a more "dignified and
blameless way out" when a court finds, on substantial . evidence, that the union is irreparably
destroyed.
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parties will be unable to pay without prejudicing their
financial ability to provide themselves and any minor
children with economic necessities, such costs may be

paid from the court expense fund.

Id.
Rose•. supra note I, at 57.
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LAND PIRACY
PRIVATE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC

LAN~S

-David Johnson
Some legal questions are left unanswered for
years, usually because they are unkown or insignificant to most of us, or because powerful
groups with vested interest to protect prefer things
to remain as they are. An example of this situation
may be found in the Virginia law governing private
use of state-owned subaqueous land. A close
examination reveals that this body of law fails to
protect public interests and creates an undue
amount of frustration for the riparian property
owner.
Any discussion of the weaknesses of the
present use permit system must be prefaced by a
brief statement of the manner in which the low
determines whether particular subaqueous land
belongs to the state or to a private po rty. ConceptuoJly, this is no problem, for the e c ctcaocococooiouououru
urtrts have ruled that "a grant or conveyance of
land bounded by a non-navigable stream carries
with it the bed of the stream to its center,"1 while
"the navigable waters and the soil under them,
within the territorial limits of the State, are the
praperty of the State, to be controlled by the State,
in its discretion, for the benefit of the people of the
State."2 The problem, of course, is in ascertaining
in particular situations whether the body of water in
question is "navigable." It has been said that "(t)he
question of navigability is one of fact. Its determination must stand an the facts of each case. The
test is whether the stream is being used, in its
natural and ordinary condition, as a highway of
commerce, on which trade or travel are or may be
conducted in the customary modes of travel on
water. " l Such broad definitions will not offer much
assistan(e to the attorney whose client wants to
know if his property line extends to the center of a
particular stream. He may offer his opinion, considering the facts as presented to him in the light of
cases decided on other facts. However, there is no
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way he can answer the question with any certainty.
The law regarding ownership of subaqueous
land has been codified,' but, with one exception,
the statute is merely declaratory of common law.;
Until 1819 the Virginio common law provided that
the riparian land owner's property line terminated
at high water mark. In that year the General Assembly passed a statute 6 giving riparian owners the
land above low water mark. Thus, in one fell stroke
thousands of acres of land were taken from the
public without a demand for any compensation
from those few citizens who were benefited thereby.
While this legislative action may be explained in
terms of the prevailing economic and political
philosophy of the nineteenth century, it cannot be
approved, since a statute of this type is clearly a
breach of the government's duty to control the use
of subaqueous land "for the benefit of the people of
the State. "7 It may be suggested that this violation
of public trust argument has brooder ramifications

if viewed in conjunction with the due process
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to
the United States Constitution. In short, on oct of
taking public land without compensation may be
unconstitutional. Such on argument has never been
raised and probably presents a moot point, since
the '8' 9 statute was upheld in Miller v. Commonwea/th.s Moreover, even if this decision were to
be reversed at some future "dote, the state could not
reacquire land used for over a hundred years by
riparian landowners without reimbursing them for
their loss.
A more important question to Virginians today
is the extent to which and for what purposes private
individuals should be allowed to use state-owned
bottom land. This determination is now the responsibility of the Virginia Morine Resources Commission (VMRC), an administrative agency which
grants use permits if certain brood statutory criteria
have been met by the applicant. Before July', '972
some uses of subaqueous land such as "fill by
riparian owners opposite their property to the
established bulkhead line"9 did not require a permit
from the VMRC. The practical effect of this exception was that in many instances a riparian
owner could acquire, at a minimal investment, land
below low water mark by extrapolating the line of
the nearest established bulkhead to a point off the
shore of his property and bUilding his bulkhead
along this imaginary line.
In' 972 the Genera I Assembly abrogated the
"established bulkhead line" exception and by
statute directed the VMRC to consider the following
in its decision making process:
In granting or denying any permit
for the use of State-owned bottom 10 nds,
the Commission shall be guided in its
deliberations by the provisions of Section 1 of Article XI of the Constitution of
Virginia, and shall" consider, among
other things, the effect of the proposed
project upon other reasonable and permissible uses of State waters and Stateowned bottom lands, its effect upon the
marine" and fisheries resources of the
Commonwealth, its effect upon the
wetlands of the Commonwealth, and its
effect upon adjacent or nearby properties, its anticipated public and private
benefits, and, in addition thereto, the
Commission shall give due consideration to standards of water quality
as established by the State Water Control Board. 1o

Article XI if the Constitution of Virginia states that
"it shall be the policy of the Commonwealth to conserve ... its public lands .. (and) to protect
its... lands.. .for the benefit, enjoyment, and general
welfare of the people of the Commonwealth."" Additionally, the VMRC was given the power "to issue
permits for all... reasonable uses of State-owned bottom
lands,
including ... the placement of
bulkheads... by owners of riparian lands, in the
waters opposite such riparian lands ... provided, that
such ... bulkheads ... shall not extend beyond
established bulkhead lines."12 Thus, it is clear that,
notwithstanding a requirement to now obtain a permit from the VMRC, it is still possible for a riparian
landowner to acquire property below the mean low
water mark. The question under existing law is
whether this is a "reasonable use" of state-owned
bottom land. To answer this the VMRC must look to
the decision-making criteria which the General
Assembly has directed it to consider.

From an examination of each criterion, it
would appear that the erection of a bulkhead below
mean low water would seldom be a "reasonable
use" of state-owned bottom. Furthermore, a common theme of all the criteria is that the use of stateowned subaqueous land must have some purpose
other than merely benefitting private interests. implicit also is the idea that such use must in some
manner benefit the public.
The riparian landowner who does obtain a
permit to construct a bulkhead below the mean low
water mark is placed in an awkward legal position.
His deed will mast likely show his property lines ending at the low water mark. Because a VMRC permit is not a grant, and since the doctrine of adverse
possession does not operate against the state,13 the
riparian owner has no way of obtaining a legal title
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to the land he has created, unless the General
Assembly may be persuaded to give him one. If he
has no title, a fortiori he should not have to pay
real estate taxes. Yet, it would also appear that he
would through use acquire vested rights in the land,
even though technically he owns only the fill
material and the State retains title to the land below·
mean low water. Practically speaking, however, a
VMRC permit is tantamount to a grant in this
situation, since it is extremely unlikely that it would
ever be revoked and the riparian property owner
ordered to restore the state-owned bottom to its
original condition. Because vested rights would certainly be acquired after a bulkhead was constructed, there is a strong argument that such a
revocation would amount to a taking, and the State
would have to compensate the landowner for his
loss.
Looking at the situation from the public's
stand-point, the state is often inadequately compensated by individuals using state-owned bottom.
It is true that the applicant must pay a permit fee of
$25.00 if the cost of the project is less than
$10,000.00 and $100.00 if it is more than
$10,000.00. " Also, the VMRC exacts a royalty of
10c to 30c per cubic yard for removal of
subaqueous land,'5 and, therefore, the person who
plans to dredge below mean low water to obtain
land fill will pay the state a small fee for the dredge
material. On the other hand, if the fill material is
obtained from some other source, the state gets
nothing for what may be perpetual use of its
property. Moreover, there are probably many persons." who opt for bypassing the time-cansuming
VMRC administrative process and dredge without a
permit. If the VMRC does not establish a viable
system of ascertaining when this occurs, private
parties will benefit at public expense with impunity.
The legal and environmental problems created
by allowing perpetual use of state-owned bottom
lands were in the post relatively insignificant, since
it was assumed that the demand for land would
never be greater than the supply availaole for edcevelopment. Today, however, real estate
developers are aware that there is an increasing
demand for waterfront property; that nearly aJi
natural riparian land hos already been exploited or
set aside for future development; and that it is thus
very profitable to "create" waterfront property by
filling wetlands or below mean low water. It is
suggested that to protect the enviroment and to
bring certainty to an ambiguous area of the law,
the General Assembly should enact legislation
which further limits the use of state-owned bottom
lands. This could be accomplished by requiring
riparian landowners to pay the state rent based on
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the value of the bottom used, computed by considering environmental damage, econmic loss to the
public, and other relevant factors. In addition, the
VMRC should be directed to adopt a system
whereby individuals who dredge or fill without a
permit could be apprehended before they complele
their illegal and environmentally destructive activities. Such measures would not halt utilization of
bottom lands, but would encourage responsible
development and result in compensation to the state
for use of a valuable public resource.
*
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(COURTHOUSE)

(from page 5)

professional and social pressures dictate some reevaluation of the existing approach to legal
education. Many law schools have successfully instituted programs of the types mentioned, and no
doubt many more will do so, and in great
profusion.
My personal view is that legal education needs
to be more responsive to the te~per of the times
and the needs of the profession as it exists today,
but I feel thot today's low student must be careful
not to fall into the trap of believing that a successful
navigation of the first semester of low qualifies him
to eschew further interest in the basic and
traditional functions of the law school. A solid
theoretical foundation is essential to success as an
attorney, and it always will be. Academic flexibilty
is needed; academic revolution is not.
Student understanding of that fact is essential
if we are to fulfill our mutual obligations to our
chosen profession.

*

MARRIAGE

(from page 11)

marriage viability when, as observed by a noted
authority, "most people believe that marriage
should be terminated when the husbond-wife
relationship is no longer able to function."?'8 The
"martial breakdown concept. .. is the heart of
most...recent legislation"'9 ond "is implicit in some
of the statutory grounds for divorce appearing in
the va rious states. "20 Since these statutory
provisions embrace social reality by implying a nofault basis for certain divorce grounds, why not
bring the entire statute into alignment with the
enlightened recognition that, where the marriage
relationship is irreparably defunct, an efficient. consistent dissolution of the marriage contract not only
averts needless suffering but increases the public
respect for a vital segment of the law.

I

"Reconciliation chances should be vastly improved; public respect for divorce law would be
enhanced; considerable time would be saved for
badly congested courts."

THE THEORIES OF "NO-FAULT"
Granted that substantive divorce law should
ground its authorization of a marriage dissolution
on whether the marital relationship can be retored,
the naturally resulting question is: what standard
should be applied °in making this determination?
Perhaps only some experimentation will resolve the
issue of whether the determination should be one of
fact by experts in the behaviorial sciences or one of
law by the judge. Most states with new no-fault
divorce legislation have made the determination
one of law to be made by the judge upon the basis
of all the eVidence, both lay and expert. 21 One
eminent authority suggests that a grant of divorce
be based on the "submission of satisfactory
evidence that, on the basis of a thorough clinical investigation ... , it was reasonably apparent thal.. .. "
the marriage was shattered beyond repair. When
the judge is so satisfied, "divorce would be granted
without guilt being imputed to either party."22
Clinical examination of the viability of the
marital relationship with an eye to determining the
likelihood of repairing the fracture should be the

crucial part of the no-fault evidentiary process.
Since public interest in the stability of marriages is
great, this clinical examination should be made incident to 0 prescribed series of conciliotion
sessions, participated in, if possible, by both
spouses and directed by skilled professional counselors.
Divorce court conciliation departments exist in
at least fifteen states 23 and are valuable not only in
saving marriages but are particularly helpful in
establishing a calm and objective attitude between
the spouses during divorce proceedings even though
reconciliation proves impossible. 24 Such an attitude
is invaluable in the adjudication of such collateral
issues as property division, alimony, support, and
custody by making justice more likely and by saving
much time for badly congested courts. 25 Such conciliation is badly needed because divorce petitions
are often filed in search of some competent body
which can provide help by impartially identifying
the casuses of the mortal conflict and by suggesting
practicable methods to resolve them. 26 One possible
objection to conciliation counseling is that, if made
mandatory, it may amount to a state invasion of the
individual's constitutional right to Privacy.28
Presently there is no clear statement in
the law specifying the rights of divorce
litigants to refuse to discuss or reveal
their private or intimate relationships.28
The effectiveness of conciliation counseling
would be vitiated without such discussion and
revealation. One solution to this problem, employed
in proposed Virginia legislation, provides the incentive of accelerating the dissolution decree for
those who agree to cooperate with the conciliation
process. 29 I nvasion of privacy problems are thus
avoided by making conciliation counseling voluntary.
I n summary then, whot are the advantages of
a system of no-foult divorce coupled with an incentive-oriented conciliotion process? Reconciliation
chances should be vastly improved; public respect
for divorce law would be enhonced;30 considerable
time would be saved for bodly congested courts;
collateral issues could be more easily and justly
resolved and children spared the painful and
psychologically damaging exposure to needless
hostility and tension; extortion-provoking defenses
would be abolished. If reconciliation proved impossible, both partners could come away from the
morriage as whole persons, cognizant of the
reasons the marriage failed and thereby prepared
with an awareness making more bright the
prospects of future marital success. 31 Society woulbe
be spored the existence of a residue of bitter and
quilt plagued divorce(e}s.
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" ... providing a more "dignified and
blameless way our' when a court finds ... that
the union is irreparably destroyed."

DISSENT AND DISSATISFACTION
To conclude this general discussion of no-fault
divorce, two widely voiced objections to the concept
will be considered. The first is that no-fault divorce
legislation makes divorce so easy that it actually
provokes or encourages divorce. There is no empirical evidence to support this charge, and the
argument ignores the ease with which divorce can
be presently obtained in almost any jurisdiction by
such expedient meons as perjury, fraud, collusion or
flight to another state. 32 The other objection is
grounded on genuine and understandable Christian
concern that by enacting no-fault divorce statutes
the state is violating the principle laid down by God
that divorce be based solely on adultery. One who
makes this seemingly valid objection may be put at
ease by being reminded of the Lord Jesus Christ's
command to "render therefore unto Caesar the
things which be Caesar's and unto God the things
which be God's"33 Every Christian marriage has
two dimensions: its spiritual dimension, over which
God is sovereign; and its legal dimension, over
which Caesar, the state, is sovereign. The state does
not initiate nor has it the authority to order the
dissolution of the spiritual plane of a marriage.
Only God can do that, and He has conditioned the
grant of a divorce of separation (a mensa et thoro),
the only type He authorizes, solely on the offense of
adultery. Therefore, temporal courts have jurisdiction only to dissolve the marriage contract and its
attendant legal obligations. Spiritual responsibility
for transgression against the spiritual dimension of
the marriage rests with its partners and not with the
state, since it is they, who have the will and free
choice to heal the fractured relationship and repent
in the sight of God for their transgressions against
the relationship. As one thoughtful commentator has
observed:

Yet the marriage vows may persist in effect after the divorce on a moralspiritual level with both parties
refraining from remarrying and thus
maintaining fidelity until the death of
the o.ther po rty. 34
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It is the duty of all courts and attorneys, and
especially Christian judges and attorneys to do
everything which is ethically within their power to
encourage reconciliation between spouses who
come to them with marital problems or seeking
divorce. Appropriate referrals should be made to
professional counselors for conciliatory service
which is beyond the competence of the attorney.

THE VIRGI N IA PROPOSAL
Turning now to an examination of key
provisions of the proposed revision to Title 20,
Chapter 6 of the Virginia Code (Dissolution,
Separation, and Annulment),31 Section 20.1-153 of
the revision admirably states it to be a policy of the
law to deal with divorce by realistically focusing on
the marriage relationship itself to assess its viability
in determining whether a decree of dissolution
should be granted. 36 This realistic orientation of the
law is further illustrated by the policy goal of
mitigating divorce-caused harm to spouses and
children and by the gool of a dispute settlement
process characterized by an amicable atmosphere.
In section 20.1-155(1) "Irreparable breakdown" is made the sole ground of divorce. 37 Wisely
the section provides that such a breakdown of the
marriage relationship may be found only when it i's
shown by substantial evidence that there are such
fundamental differences that the "legitimate objects
of matrimony have been destroyed ond there
remains no reasonable likelihood that the marriage'
can be preserved." These terms seem to be to the
point and will be further clarified in the contect of
particular cases which construe them in the Virginio
Supreme Court of Appeals.
Sections 20.1-163 and 20.1-175 prescribe a
conciliation procedure whi.ch must be subscribed to
by the parties if they wish a decree of dissolution
immediately after the required ninety day conciliation period instead of waiting for the
prescribed period of one year to elapse, should
they elect not to porticipote in conciliation. 38 This
provision uses the incentive technique already
discussed to avoid objections of invasion of privacy.
However, section 20.1-163 requires respondent to
complete and file a conciliation questionaire within
thirty days of being served with copies of pelillon
and summons. This writer feels that this provision is
an unwarranted invasion of respondent's privacy
despite statutory assurances that respondent's
questionaire "shall be confidential and may be
used only by the court. counsel for the parties, or
persons authorized by the court."

Section 20.1-176, granting an emergency
decree sooner than ninety days at the discretion of
the court, is warded in such vague and overbroad
language as to invite abuse. This provision should
be re-written autharizing this accelerated decree
only upon a showing of ane of several specified
grounds of emergency. Section 20.1-170 wisely
abolishes all defenses to an action for divorce such
as recriminotion, conivance, and collusion.
That the court may "refuse to grant the petition
on the uncorroborated testimony of the pa rties or
either of them" is inconsistent with the basic reform
objectives of this no-fault oriented revision .. Where
there are no third party witnesses to the conditions
which evince an irreparably broken marriage
relationship, one vindictive party can block
dissolution of a dead and intolerable relationship.
This inconsistent provision should be struck from
section 20.1-105.
With the objections just noted remedied as
suggested, this code revision would seem to bring
Virginia's substantive divorce law into harmony with
what appears to be the most enlightened modern
thinking on the subject. This thinking, as already
pointed out, espouses a divorce law that uses every
reasonably available means of judicially encouraging the preservation of our society's key
relationship while providing a more "dignified and
blameless way out" when a court finds, on substantial . evidence, that the union is irreparably
destroyed.

*
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INSURANCE

(from page 9)

the. situation of his having to satisfy any judgments
against him out of his own pocket. The criminal
law, on the other hand, does punish the wreck less
and negligent driver in many cases. No-fault
proposals do not ottempt to disturb the criminal
sanctions against such drivers. This moral
justification for the present tort system as applied to
automobile negiligence cases, then, tends to lose its
force when one delves beneath the surface. Perhaps
it is not inaccurate to say that automobile
negligence low has to some extent prostituted the
basis of the tort liability system by encouraging the
development of liability insurance to protect the
negligent driver from the consequences of his
negligent acts.25
Finally, there are the assertions that no-fault
will not result in lower rates at all; that instead
rates will remain unchanged or may even rise. 26
Possibly there was merit to these positions before
no-fault insurance was tested in practice, but the
success in Massachusetts tends to support the view
that no-fault plans, in fact, offer substantial
premium reductions. There has been no convincing
evidence of no-fault. bringing higher rates that has
not been discredited by the cost reduction of approximately forty percent in Massachusetts. 27
CONCLUSIONS
Change is in the wind for the automobile insurance industry in Virginia, and political leaders
ignore the public concern over the issue at their
peril. Jhe real question is related to the form the
changes will take in Virginia and the extent of the
changes. It is a question that demands an objective
study of all alternatives, not an emotional, selfserving or haphazard approach. The no-fault concept poses some serious questions that must be answered, but it appears to have captured the public's
support. The comparative negligence approach
recommended by the State Bar committee certainly
presents what may be an acceptable alternative. Its
major obstacle, however, is the tremendous amount
of publicity the no-fault proposals have had and the
sensational success of the Massachusetts Plan. The
consumer will tend to opt for the plan that serves
him best for the least cost, and other interest groups
will naturally be influenced by their special concerns. The General Assembly, then, must face the
problem by considering all alternatives and adopting the plan most suitable for Virginia. 28,
There is nothing sacred in a concept or idea
just because it is old, and prudent change of a constructive nature should not be feared. The no-fault
proposals do not represent change for its own sake,
but, rather, offer a plausible alternative for coping
with a need-the need for prompt, efficient in-
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surance coverage at a reasonable cost. While it is a
proposal that alters a basic area of the law, our
legal system is, idealiy, geared to accomodate such
change when necessary. From the consumer's
viewpoint, no-foult insurance mokes sense; and
because the consumer in this instance is largely the
middle-class individual, who is also the typical
voter, Virginia can anticipate the General Assembly's adoption of some form of no-fault automobile
liability insurance within the near future.
""
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The Winds Of Change

Dean Curtis must have been pleased with his
graduating class of '48 as late May, 1967 brought
exams to a close. Wayne "Flub" O'Bryan was certainly just as pleased with his receipt in that year of
the American Law Student Association's Silver Key
Award for leadership. As SBA President he increased student activity in the ABA and initiated the
now traditional Barristers' Ball. I n the process, he
earned the WAR. Goodwin Scholarship, was listed
in Who's Who Among Students in American
Colleges and Universities, and attended the
American Law Student Association Annual Meeting
in Montreal, Canada.
1972 finds David Wayne O'Bryan a partner in
the Richmond, Virginia firm of White, Cabell, Paris
and Lowenstein and President of the William and
Mary Law School Association. Mr. O'Bryon attended Benedictine High School and Richmond
Professional Institute in Richmond before coming to
William and Mary College in Williamsburg. In
1970, after a number of years association with
White, Reynolds, Smith and Winters in Norfolk,
Virginia, Mr. O'Bryan returned to Richmond for his
present position. Just four and one-half years ago
Mr. O'Bryan was working his way through law
school as a wine steward at the King's Arms and
sharing the house on Duffie Drive with a fellow
student David Wittan. Those few years have seen a
dramatic progression for him, not unlike the change
from a law school of 290 students to 450 students.
I n fact, this sense of tra nsition set the tone for a
recent conversation with Mr. O'Bryan about his
reactions to the changes at the law school and his
enthusiam for the growing Law School Association.
"Personally," Mr. O'Bryan reflects, "I'm glad
to see the growth at Marshall Wythe. I n order to
grow in stature the law school had to grow in size.
It was just absolutely too small before to become
the outstanding professional school that it has the
potential to be, though that stature may be obtainable at the present size of approximately 450
. students."

The growth in the law school inevitably led to
the growing community of Marshall Wythe alumni.
"I was interested in alumni activities before I
graduated. Our relation back to our school is the
one thing we all have in common. and the fact that
we all are graduates of the law school is enhanced
by the recent progress at the school." Actually,
Wayne O'Bryan, Steve Harris, and Jerry Franklin,
the editor of their Law Review, left William and
Mary with the clear intention of becoming immediately instrumental in shaping a stronger alumni
community. Such determination was characteristic
of "Flub" O'Bryan. The nickname, based upon a
286 pound SBA President, was totally inapplicable
to the counselor at White, Cabell, Paris and Lowenstein of around 90 pounds lighter. That trait of perseverance was not lost in the group's efforts to
"build a Marshall Wythe alumni and friends
association." Their success is substantial.
Marshall Wythe is now honored with almost
800 alumni of increasing professional competency
and geographical diversity. Mr. O'Bryan assumed
the Presidency in April of this year. Several changes
have resulted. "The Annual Association spring
meeting is being moved to the fall. The meeting this
year on Saturday, October 14 offered many more
events of interest to alumni-from the morning
seminars and the luncheon to the football game,
followed by the cocktail party. We didn't expect
everyone to come to every event but hoped instead
that everyone would enjoy at least one program.
This new time should prove more convenient and enjoyable to alumi. This year's program has taken a
lot of work. I really appreciate the diligence of our
Board of Directors members, the consistent work of
Bob Dutro, and the efforts of Judge Hal Bonney in
coordinating Homecoming."
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Perhaps the most ambitious change initiated
by Mr. O'Bryan is the renewal of a Marshall Wythe
fund raising program this year. Originally contributions to the low school were applied to the
Woodbridge Fund, established by the Association to
eventually produce sufficient income to endow a
"choir of low" at Marshall Wythe and furnish
student scholarships.
There was consideration by Dr. Graves,
President of the College of William and Mary that
college-wide fund raising might be in the best interests of the low school as well as the va rious
organizations and departments. But "there is a substantial feeling among the alumni and friends of the
low school that I know personally, that whatever
they contribute must go totally to their low school.
Also, information from my attending a recent Fund
Raising Conference in Washington suggests that a
fund raising campaign run by the Association will
yield the most benefits to the low school. It is the
recommendation of the Boord that while we will be
able to use some college services, this will be on effort conducted by our Association."
Is 100% fund participation just a campaign
drive away? "Well, alumni participation has been
fairly consistent over the years that I've been
associated--it's been poor!" But transition is in
motion and the Association under Mr. O'Bryan's
guidance has fostered the increased alumni interest.
Between the new Homecoming schedule, issues of
the Alumni Briefs, and the spirit of a fund campaign
at a time when the low school is stretching its
resovrces, increasing alumni interest is being reinforced.
Certainly, the changes in the low school and
its alumni association have been pronounced, and
at the end of our conversation there was a residual
enthusiasm for what progress those next four and
one-half years might bring.

*

CLASS OF 1944
WILLIAM O. MORRIS, a professor of law at
West Virginia University, ance again lectured at
Johannes Gutenburg University, Mainz, Germany
for a month this past Mayas a Fullbright Professor.
Mr. Morris also served as a visiting professor lost
summer at Hastings College of Law, University of
California, and lectured at the Sixth International
Xeeting on Forensic Sciences, Edinburg, Scotland, in
September. He has authored a new book, Dental
Litigation, published this year by Michie Co.,
Charlottesville, Virginia.

CLASS OF 1960
Listed in the 1972 Who's Who in Government
is HARMON D. MAXSON, Mr. Maxson is on attorney for the Indian Claims Commission and on
honorary member of the Beaver Clan of the Seneca
Indian Tribe, and Six Nations of the Iroquois
League.

CLASS OF 1961
DOUGLAS BOECKMAN is a candidate for an
LL.M. at New York University. He is presently Appeals Attorney for Liberty Mutual Insurance Company in New York City and resides at 311 W.90th
Street, New York, New York 10024.
LARRY WISP has the proud distinction of
recently being elected as Boss of the Year by the
Norfolk-Portsmouth Area Legal Secretaries'
Association. Mr. Wisp has been active as both
secretary and treasurer in recent years in the City
of Chesapeake Bar Association.

CLASS OF 1963
T. L. GROOMS of East Moline Illinois is
manager of Industrial and Labor Relations for the
John Deere Company there.

CLASS OF 1932
Presently serving Marshall-Wythe School of
Low as a member of its Boord of Directors is
RUSSELL A. COLLINS. A past president of the
Newport News Bar Association, Mr. Callins is also
serving as local Judge of Elections, Chairman of the
Electoral Boord, and Bail Commissioner.
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One of five winners of the Federal Bar
Association's 1971 Younger Federal Lawyer Award
for outstanding legal service to the Federal Government was CHARLES A. WHITE, JR. Mr. White is
presently Chief, International Affairs Division, Office of the Judge Advocate, U.S. Army, Earope and
7th Army, in Germany. He supervises an office staff
of 18 persons, including 8 other civilian and
military attorneys. His duties include negotiation interpretation, implementation of treaties and other
international agreements with seven European ond

Middle Eastern countries, as well as monitoring of

011 foreign criminal jurisdiction exercised over U.S.

CLASS OF 1969

personnel by the Federal Republic of Germany,
Belgium and France. His staff is also responsible for
the conduct of all civil litigation on behalf of or
against the U.s. Forces in Germany.

& Mary Law School Association, has been named

WILLIAM M. WHITTEN, III took his Ll.M. in
Government Procurement Low at George
Washington University in 1971. He is currently a
major with the Army's Judge Advocate General's
Corps at the U.s. Aviation Systems Command
Headquaters in SI. Louis, Missouri.
.

CLASS OF 1966
ROBERT E. KANE, JR. is a portner in the firm
of Sullivan and Kane in Richmond, Virginia. His
business address is 1508 Willow Lawn Drive, Richmond.
One of the Assistant Attorney Generals for the
Commonwealth of Virginia is WILLIAM T. LEHNER.
He advises present students that knowledge of lega I
research is the single most important subject of low
school.
KENNETH N. WHITEHURST, JR., married to
the former lillie l. Switzenbaum, is on Associate
Judge with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court, Virginia Beach, Va. He served in the House
of Delegates of the Virginia General Assembly in
1968 and 1970. In 1969, Ken was honored as on
Outstanding Alumnus by the notional office of Phi
Alpha Delta Legal Fraternity.

CLASS OF 1967

ROBERT S. DURTRO, secretary of the William
Substitute Judge for the James City County-York
County-City of Williamsburg Courts.
ROBERT P. KAHN is a staff member of the
Judge Advocate General's Office, 12th Naval
District Regional Medical Center, Oakland, California. His address is 1051 Bello Vista, Apartment 3,
Oakland, California, 94610.
Current treasurer for the Montgomery-FloydCity of Radford (Va.) Bar Association is ROBERT A.
LOWMAN. Robert is in private practice in Radford
and tells students to learn all they can about civil
and criminal procedure.
J. LARRY PALMER is a portner in the new firm
of Stokes, Lemmond, and Palmer of Hopewell, Va.
Larry has lately been active in Big Brother and Drug
Abuse programs in the Hopewell area. His advice to
students is to spend every spore minute in the courthouse.

CLASS OF 1971
SUSAN BUNDY COCKE is on associate with
. McClintock and Mullins in Tazewell, Virginia. She
is secretory-treasurer of the Tazewell Bar
Association and secretary of the 22nd Judicial Circuit. The Cockes live at 106 Marion Avenue,
Tazewell, Virginia 24651
STANLEY M. HIRSCH has opened his own low
firm in Chesapeake, Virginia. His business address
is I ndian River Professional Building, 4310 East I ndian River Rood, Chesapeake, Virginia 23325.

CRAIG U. DANA, formerly with the U.S.
Navy's Judge Advocate General's Office, is now
associated with the firm of Morris, Downing and
Sherred of Newton, New Jersey. His residence address is 30 South Shore, Sparta, New Jersey 07871.

Associated with the firm of James and Consolvo of Virginia Beach, Va. is DONALD E. LEE, JR.
Don recently completed three months active duty
with the U.S. Army in Fort Benning, Georgia.

STEWART P. DAVIS has recently opened his
own office for general practice in Falls Church,
Virginia. Upon resigning from his JAG Commission
lost December, he received a Meritorious Service
Medal from the U.S. Army Judiciary, Defense Appellate Division. The Davis' become the parents of a
son, Ned, in May of 1971.

We would like to thank everyone for their continued response to our column, and once again we
invite all alumni to drop us a short note informing
us of any important changes or events in your life
and career. Write to:

Judith Getsug became the bride of BURKE W.
MARGULIES in August of 1971. He is presently
Trust Officer for the First Virginia Bank of Tidewater
and also for the Trust Company of First Virginia in
Norfolk.
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